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Abstract
In this paper we study the relationship between the relative size of
the U.S. nonprofit sector and population heterogeneity, at the county
level, by adopting and extending the model of Alesina, Baquir and
Easterly (1999). The relative size of the voluntary sector is assessed
as a share of voluntary donations in the total public good provided
locally via public expenditures and private contributions.
We demonstrate empirically that the relative size of the nonprofit sec-
tor in each county depends not only on its population heterogeneity,
but also on its neighbors’ average relative size of the nonprofit sec-
tor and average population heterogeneity. Moreover, this relationship
seems to be unstable across counties as the signs and magnitudes of
neighborhood effects vary with geographical location.
JEL classification: C21, D71, H41.
Keywords: Public good, Nonprofit sector, Parameter heterogeneity,
Spatial models
1 Introduction
Since the seminal work of Weisbrod (1977, 1986), voluntary organizations are
recognized as alternative mechanisms of private provision of collective-type
goods. Though criticized (e.g. DiMaggio and Anheier, 1990), Weisbrod’s
approach remains the dominant theoretical perspective in the nonprofit field.
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He pointed out the role of voluntary nonprofit sector as a “major provider
of collective-consumption goods which enter positively utility functions of a
limited set of persons representing a demand insufficient to organize govern-
mental or market provision of excludable goods”. Thus the voluntary sector
is considered as an extra-governmental provider of collective consumption
goods which represents an alternative for unsatisfied demanders. The unsat-
isfied demands arise from the fact that in a majority voting political system,
political decisions about provision of local public goods tend to satisfy the
demand of the median voter. Government finances the public provision of
public goods by compulsory taxation. In a democratic society with het-
erogeneous demand, voters who are not satisfied by the public provision of
collective good can either move to another jurisdiction or form a voluntary
organization to supplement the government ’s provision. The broadly quoted
Weisbrod’s theory predicts that “the relative size of the voluntary sector in
a field [e.g. education or health] can be expected as a function of the hetero-
geneity of population demands. Thus, for any given level of governmentally
provided output, the market share of the voluntary sector in the provision
of collective goods will vary directly with the heterogeneity among individual
demand schedules for these goods”(p.61). While Weisbrod did not propose
any explicit model, he clearly augured that “if two political units differ in the
degree of heterogeneity of their populations, the more homogenous unit will,
ceteris paribus, have a lower level of voluntary sector provision of collective-
type goods or their private-good substitutes” (idem).
In the same perspective, James (1993) presented an empirical cross-country
study of educational services provided both by public and nonprofit sectors.
She assumed that the relative size of the nonprofit sector in education was
a function of ”excess demand”, ”differentiated demand” for education, cul-
tural and income heterogeneity of population, and public policies towards
education (public educational spending and public subsides to private edu-
cation). The excess demand is supposed to stem from people who are un-
satisfied by the publicly provided level of education or excluded from public
provision because of low public spending. The differentiated demand flows
from people with preferences for specific features which result from cultural,
religious or other affiliations. She studied the relative size of the nonprofit
sector in the field of education with the percentage of enrollments in private
nonprofit schools used as proxy. 1 She finds that cultural (and particularly
religious) heterogeneity of populations is an important determinant of the
larger size of the nonprofit educational sector.
Lassen (2006) provides a cross-country study explaining the size of the infor-
mal sector by the degree of country’s ethnic heterogeneity. He considers the
1The private sector is considered here as a synonym of the nonprofit one. According
to James (1993), in many countries ”nonprofit status is legally required for educational
institutions”.
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informal sector as opposed to the public one and supposes that in ethnically
heterogenous societies, ethnic communities may constitute an alternative for
public provision of some public goods. He finds a positive effect of popu-
lation ethnic heterogeneity on the size of the informal sector. While using
regional dummy variables, he does not find any significant regional pattern
in the studied relationship.
However, the effects of populations’ heterogeneity on the relative size of vol-
untary sector are not straightforward. On the one hand, it is a source of
economic and other individual incentives to deliver a public good, which is
under-provided or provided in an unsatisfactory manner by state or mar-
ket. On the other hand, previous literature indicated that heterogeneity
may also be a source of inefficiencies in the provision of local public goods
(Alesina et al, 1999, Miguel and Gugerty, 2004) and charitable giving in the
U.S.A. (Okten and Osili, 2005). In these studies, the economic and social
heterogeneities of population assessed through income inequality and ethnic
or religious fractionalization (Alesina et al, 2003) negatively influence the
provision of public goods. Moreover, an empirical study of Alesina and La
Ferrara, (2000) on the effects of population heterogeneity on membership in
groups suggests that income and ethnic heterogeneities diminish the propen-
sity to participate in social activities (measured as membership in groups),
particularly for ”face-to-face” groups, where direct interactions among peo-
ple are important. The idea underlying these studies is that heterogeneity
in agents’ characteristics may be translated into heterogeneous preferences
towards public good. The question we raise in this paper concerns precisely
the effects of heterogeneity in population characteristics on the portion of
local public good generated through private donations.
Methodologically, we investigate the effects of population heterogeneity
on the relative size of the U.S. nonprofit sector using three different ap-
proaches. The first one, the standard linear regression model estimated by
OLS assumes that the relationship under study is stationary over space and
that there is no spatial dependence in the observations. As in the empiri-
cal papers mentioned above, it is implicitly assumed that observations are
spatially independent, i.e. there are no interactions between neighboring
counties.
However, spatial dependence may arise when we deal with located observa-
tions because of measurement errors for observations or because some unob-
served economic and social phenomena present a spatial structure leading
to complex interactions. Therefore, the second estimation approach incor-
porates explicitly spatial dependence through the inclusion of the spatially
lagged dependent and independent variables. The maximum likelihood esti-
mation of the resulting model called a Spatial Durbin model (SDM) allows
us to demonstrate the existence of geographical spillovers among U.S. coun-
ties as the relative size of the nonprofit sector in a county depends not only
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on the values of its own independent variables, but also on the average val-
ues of the dependent and independent variables in the neighboring counties.
In order to test the robustness of the SDM results, a Matrix Exponential
Spatial Structure (MESS) model is also estimated. The MESS results sup-
port the SDM ones.
The possible spatial non stationarity of the relationship under study is also
ignored and results in global modelling. However, the spatial non station-
arity of the relationship across counties may result from misspecification in
the model (e.g omitted variables, a wrong functional form) or from intrin-
sically different behaviors of local governments. As pointed out by Durlauf
(2002), Durlauf and Fafchamps (2003), if the distribution of a given error
depends on its associated geographical area, then a model allowing for para-
meter heterogeneity is appropriate to fit the data. In other words, parameter
estimates may differ across geographical units (Brock and Durlauf, 2001).
Although ignoring this aspect may lead to misleading conclusions concerning
studied relationships between variables, especially in cross-country analysis,
most empirical works do not allow for parameter heterogeneity. For instance,
Salamon et al (2000) looked at the relationship between the size of nonprofit
sector (measured as a percentage of total nonagricultural employment) and
the population’s religious heterogeneity in different countries. Based on the
estimations of a linear regression, they concluded that no significant rela-
tionship was detected. According to their data, ”...countries with similar
levels of fractionalization, such as Colombia and Ireland, or the Netherlands
and the U.K., vary considerably in the size of their nonprofit sectors” (p.
10.) However, does it really make sense to suppose that an increase in ethnic
heterogeneity in Latin America and in Europe would have the same effect
on the size of the nonprofit sector?
To take into account the possible spatial non stationarity, the assumption
of spatial stationarity is alleviated. We use the Spatial Autoregressive Local
Estimate (SALE) model developed by Pace and LeSage (2002) as it accom-
modates simultaneously for spatial dependence and parameter heterogene-
ity. The SALE results detect spatial variation in the parameter estimates
meaning that the relationship under study is not stable across counties.
The paper is organized as follows. The theoretical foundations are pre-
sented in section one. Section two describes the data used for analysis.
Section three is devoted to the different econometric approaches adopted in
the paper. Results are displayed in section four. Section five concludes.
2 Theoretical model
To formalize the link between the relative size of the voluntary sector and
population heterogeneity, we adopt and extend the model of Alesina et al
(1999.)
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2.1 The model of Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999)
Consider a jurisdiction (a county, for instance) of size 1, in which political
decisions about the size and the type of local public good g are taken by
majority-vote rule. The individual preferences are written as
Ui = ga(1− li) + c, (1)
with
0 < a < 1,
0 ≤ li ≤ 1,
where g is the local public good which can be located on an ”ideological line”
[0,1] of individual preferences concerning different types of public good; li is
the distance between the individual i’s preferred public good and the deliv-
ered one; c denotes the private consumption. Income is considered as equal
for everybody, and private consumption is equal to disposable revenues:
c = y − t (2)
In (2), y is the pre-tax income and t is the lump-sum tax equal for everyone
by assumption. As the size of population is normalized at 1, the aggregate
and per capita variables are the same, so g per capita equals the total size
of g. Then the public budget constraint is
g = t, (3)
Now individual preferences can be rewritten as follows:
Ui = ga(1− li) + y − g, (4)
Here it is supposed this jurisdiction decides by majority rule first on the
amount of taxation and thus on the size of the public good, and second on
the type of the public good.According to the median voter theorem, for any
positive amount of the public good g, the type of public good chosen for the
provision will be the most preferred by the median voter. Thus the optimal
size of the public good is given by the solution of equation (5).
maxUi = ga(1− l˜i) + y − g, (5)
where l˜i is the distance of individual i from the type preferred by the median
voter. The equation above incorporates the fact that when the decision on
the size of g is taken, the agents know that the type of the publicly provided
local public good will be the one most preferred by the median voter. The
solution of (5) gives the individual i’s most preferred size of public good:
g∗i = [a(1− l˜i)]1/(1−a), (6)
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Now, following Alesina et al (1999) note l˜m as the median distance from the
type most preferred by the median voter or ”the median distance from the
median”. If the agents know that the type of the public good chosen for the
public provision will be the one most preferred by the median voter, then
the amount of public good provided in equilibrium will be given by
g∗ = [a(1− l˜m)]1/(1−a), (7)
polarization of preferences. voter, Equation (7) implies that in equilibrium,
the amount of public good of the type preferred by the median voter is de-
creasing in l˜m.
2.2 Heterogeneity effects on individual utility
On the basis of the model above, it is possible to express the individual
utility resulting from g∗ by substituting g∗ in (4).
Ui(g∗) = g∗[
1− l˜i
a(1− l˜m)
− 1] + y, (8)
The individual utility drawn from the optimal size and type of public good
g∗ is decreasing with the distance to the median voter l˜i. People with l˜i
smaller than l˜m are relatively close to the type preferred by median voter,
while people with l˜i greater than l˜m are relatively distant, hence less satis-
fied by the public provision.
The median distance l˜m can be proxied by some measures of populations’
cultural, ethnic, linguistic or religious heterogeneities. Think for instance of
preferences for education or art that can be strongly related to cultural or
ethnic backgrounds.
According to this model, when an important fraction of population is at a
great distance from the median voter, hence the median distance from the
median voter preferred type is large, and the type of public good is far from
corresponding to the preferences of a large share of population. In this case
this population would prefer to contribute less to this public good and to
keep taxes low. On the other hand, this category of population would devote
more resources to private consumption. The wealthiest people can replace
collective-type good by its private substitutes. Moreover, in some jurisdic-
tions with heterogeneous population, public resources may be directed to
some specific groups of population via some preferential treatments or ”pa-
tronage” (Alesina et al, 1999).
In this paper we assume that people who are unsatisfied by the public pro-
vision of collective-type goods may create voluntary organizations or con-
tribute to them in order to provide collective-type goods or services that
correspond better to their preferences and needs (Weisbrod, 1986.)
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2.3 The case with voluntary contributions
Giving to voluntary organizations targets some individual preferences more
perfectly than the governmental provision of public good. Individuals may
prefer to redistribute a part of their income towards charities (or nonprofit
organizations) responding to the needs or causes they feel particularly con-
cerned about. Therefore, donating is a private act of income redistribution
as well as a means of provision of some public goods. Let us consider private
donations to voluntary organizations as an example of monetary resources
identified with collective-type goods provided via private redistribution. We
also call the latter privately provided local public good, which is ”local”
in the sense that it may correspond more or less well to the preferences of
individuals according to its locations in ideological, geographical or other
spaces.
Let us locate the chosen public good type on the ”ideological line” [0,1] at
0 and the type of privately provided public good at 1, according to the idea
of a strong complementarity between these two local public goods. Suppose
the population’s characteristics are distributed following a normal unimodal
law. This can be obtained by the expression of a given individual preference
from its proper characteristic through a twice-differentiable function from
R into [0,1] giving 0 for the mean and 1 for the extremes2. Figure (1) illus-
trates a location of i between the different types of publicly and privately
provided public goods.
Figure 1: The individual i’s location on the ”ideological line”.
li
1−li
0 1
i
Publicly
provided
type
Privately
provided
type
Following Weisbrod’s suggestion, we assume that individuals who are
less satisfied with the public provision of public good may decide to create
2Take for instance the function g(x) = 1− e−x2
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or to contribute to a nonprofit. We incorporate this idea into the model by
introducing voluntary contributions into the basic expression of individual
utility. Incorporating the voluntary contributions into equation (4) yields
equation (9):
Ui = g∗a(1− li) + dbli + y − g∗ − di(1− γ), (9)
0 < b < 1,
where di is the individual i’s contribution to the differentiated public
good, b is the parameter of technology of the privately provided local public
good and γ is the marginal tax rate. As equation (9) shows, the model de-
scribes the context of a jurisdiction, where voluntary donations are deduced
from imposable revenues.
d =
∑
i
di, (10)
Equation (9) assumes that technologies a and b of publicly and privately
provided local public goods are independent and may differ.
If the type and the amount of public good are the most preferred by the
median voter, the individual’s preferred amount of contribution is given by
the solution of:
maxUi = g∗a(1− l˜i) + db l˜i + y − g∗ − di(1− γ), (11)
where g∗ is given by (7). The solution of (11) for di is
d∗i = [
1− γ
bl˜i
]
1
b−1 , (12)
Now the amount of giving may be defined by
d∗ = [
1− γ
bl˜m
]
1
b−1 , (13)
From equation (13) it follows that the equilibrium amount of giving that
we associate with the differentiated public good is increasing in l˜m, the me-
dian distance from the type preferred by the median voter.
The total supply of public good can be written as the sum of publicly and
privately provided public goods G = g + d, where d is the differentiated
public good corresponding to the part of expenditures targeting the pref-
erences of those who donate better, and g is the part of pure public good
corresponding to the median voter’s most preferred type and not or very
imperfectly to the demand of the people whose preferences are located far
from the median voter’s preferences.
As Figure (2) shows, the increasing heterogeneity in population’s character-
istics measured by l˜m leads to the raise of the share of privately provided
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public good in total public good G (noted Rd = d/G and represented by the
continuous line), and to the decrease of the portion of its public provision
(noted Rg = g/G and represented by the dropped line).
Figure 2: Rg (dotted line) and Rd (continuous line) as functions of l˜m, when a=b=0.5 and γ = 0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
l_m
The rest of the paper provides empirical evidences of the relationship
between the relative size of privately provided public good and population’s
heterogeneity.
3 The data
The following proposal from an advertisement well illustrates why voluntary
contributions can be considered as a means of supporting cause an individual
feels concerned about: ”When choosing a charity, it is important to decide
what is most important to you. Most likely, it will be something that has
personally affected you. For example, consider your Alma Mater, medical
research for a disease that a loved one has endured, the training fund for an
athlete you admire, or a local community initiative”.
In the United States the voluntary sector is represented by two main types
of nonprofit organizations. The first one embodies the organizations regis-
tered in section 501(c)3 of the Internal Revenue Code (this category includes
cultural organizations, foundations, nonprofit schools and universities, day-
care centers, charities, and community improvement organizations among
others.) These organizations are tax exempt, and they can receive tax-
deductible charitable donations from individuals, but cannot engage in any
political or commercial activities. The second type is represented by the
organizations falling under the smaller 501(c)4 category such as some so-
cial welfare organizations, organizations performing lobbying activities on
behalf of specific issues, social clubs and others. Generally, contributions
to this type of nonprofit are not tax-deductible, except for some volun-
teer fire companies and similar organizations, as well as some war veteran’s
organizations. One cannot deduct his or her donations to labor unions, po-
litical candidates, social clubs, homeowner associations, most of the foreign
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charities, and organizations performing social activities for the pleasure or
recreation of members.
In the U.S. only itemized donations reduce taxable income.3 The tax sav-
ing from the act of giving usually equals the amount of deduction (which is
normally the total contributed except in some cases) times the marginal tax
rate, namely the top rate for the person’s income level. Giving to federal,
state, and local government is also tax-deducible if the contribution is for
public purposes. However, voluntary organizations are more likely to attract
private monetary and labor donations than governments (Rose-Ackerman,
1996.) According to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), in 1998 the direct
contributions represented more than 50 percent of total contributions, gifts
and grants received by 501(c)3 organizations. Americans gave 160 billion
dollars to charities in 1998, and donations rose up to 212 billion in 2001.
According to IRS, in 1999 about 35.5 million taxpayers made deductible
charitable contributions totaling nearly 125.8 billion dollars. Contributions
from individuals account for more than 75 percent and about 82 percent of
total giving is itemized for federal income tax returns.4 The data concern-
ing the giving are drawn from the National Center for Charitable Statistics.
They indicate the amount of total itemized households’ contributions by
U.S. county. Counties seem to represent a relevant level of analysis as they
deal with provision of a large fraction of local public goods. They support
the provision of local public goods in the fields of public welfare, health and
hospitals, environment and housing (parks, recreation, community develop-
ment) among others. The provision of local public goods is financed by local
taxes (e.g. property tax, 23,3 percent of general revenue), intergovernmental
transfers (35.5 percent in 1996-97, coming mostly from states), and charges.
According to the U.S. Census Bureau,5 in 1996-97, the U.S. counties’ expen-
ditures on public welfare, educational services, hospitals, health, and parks
and recreation equaled respectively 13.5 percent, 13.2 percent, 9.8 percent,
7.3 percent, and 2 percent of total expenditures.
For the analysis provided below, it is important to mention that U.S. coun-
ties kept their borders constant over years. The dependent variable which
is supposed to indicate the share of impure public good in total public good
is constituted as follows: Y = Rd = dd+g , where d is the amount of total
households’ contributions in each county reported in 1998, g is the amount
of public expenditures in each county in 1996-97 which comes from the U.S.
Census Bureau, 1997 Census of Governments.
As we are testing the local effects of population heterogeneity on the relative
size of the voluntary sector, our main explanatory variable we are interested
in is the index measuring population heterogeneity. We employ the broadly-
3The donations are deduced from the federal personal income tax.
4In this study we do not take into account the non-itemized charitable contributions.
5Source:http://www.census.gov/govs/estimate/97countysummary.html
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used measure of heterogeneity named ”fractionalization” which indicates the
probability for two randomly selected individuals in a county to be affiliated
to different ethnic groups (Alesina et al (1999), Alesina et al (2003), Alesina
et al, (2002.)) Alesina and al, 1999 provide a detailed explanation of ethnic
heterogeneity as a proxy of preferences heterogeneity of population. It is
generally calculated as follows:
FRACTj = 1−
∑
(Ethnicij)
2, (12)
where Ethnicij denotes the share of population in a county j self-identified
as of ethnic group i. Following the classification used by the U.S. Census
i = White, Black, American Indian or Alaska, Asian, Hawaiian or Pacific,
Other, two or more races. As noted Alesina et al, 1999, the category Other
represents essentially Hispanic people. The index of population ethnic het-
erogeneity was calculated from the U.S. Census 1998 data. A fractional-
ization index equal to 0 for a county means that all households affiliate
themselves to the same ethnic group, while a fractionalization index value
of 1 represents the maximum heterogeneity. When the index of fractional-
ization tends to 0, that means that there is a dominant ethnic group. When
it tends to 1, several more or less equal groups are present in the county. In
this study, the index of ethnic heterogeneity lies in the range [0.01 0.687]. To
assess linguistic heterogeneity, we use the share of population which is more
than 5 years old and speaks another language at home. We measure income
inequality at the county level (variable ”incineg”) as a ratio of the mean
household income to the median household income in a county (Alesina and
al, 1999, p. 1259). In order to account for other differences in preferences,
we introduce the variables of income per capita (variable ”income”), the
share of people living below the level of poverty (variable ”poverty”),the
percentage of population of 65 years and older (variable ”age”), as well as
the percentage of population older than 25 with a bachelors degree or higher
(variable ”education”).
We know that a rise in wealth tends to increase the demand of public goods.
However, with still growing wealth, the demand of certain public goods
decreases and leads to the substitution of public goods by their private ana-
logues (e.g. municipal versus private swimming pools). In other words, the
demand for such collective goods is a peaked function of income.
As it was stressed in the previous literature, the life cycle hypothesis pre-
dicts that persons over 65 years tend to spend a larger part of their current
income on immediate consumption than younger people, and to demand a
larger quantity of public goods than younger persons with the same income
and tax share (Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973.) The level of education can
affect the public provision of public goods as more educated counties can
choose better public policies, demand more education for children, or mon-
itor provision of public goods (Alesina and al, 1999.) The size and type
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of population may affect the share of giving in the total public expendi-
tures in different manners. For example, large urban jurisdictions are often
considered as suffering from inefficiencies in the provision of public goods
and as more unwieldy than small ones. Therefore, in some jurisdictions
people may contribute relatively more to nonprofits in the amount of local
expenditures. Moreover, in larger urban jurisdictions the amount of giving
may be positively affected by the greater number of organizations asking
for voluntary contributions. On the other hand, as jurisdictions with small
population can exert more social control, one can speculate that voluntary
income redistribution could be higher in smaller jurisdictions. We assess the
type of population through the log of urban population in each county. The
size of population is assessed through the log of population of each county
reported in the US Census 1997. The set of the explanatory variables used
in the model is written as :
X = [ι, frac, incineg, otherlanguage, log population, log urban population, poverty,
education, age, income per capita], with ι denoting a vector of constant term
6.
The location of the 3111 counties is determined using the 1990 census in-
formation on latitude and longitude. 48033, We have decided to exclude
from the analysis, observations related to the District of Columbia (zip code
11001) because of its special status. Alaska and Hawaii have also been ex-
cluded from the analysis as they do not share a common border with other
counties. Associated with the initial 23 missing values in the dataset, we
get a sample of 3083 observations.
4 The spatial econometric approach
4.1 Global models with fixed spatial weight matrix
4.1.1 Assuming homoscedastic errors
When observations are geographical units as countries, spatial dependence
and heterogeneity may arise among observations. Spatial dependence is de-
fined as the lack of independence between observations over space (Anselin,
1988). For instance, positive spatial dependence occurs when similar loca-
tions in space exhibit similar values which leads to apparent clusters in space.
To accommodate spatial autocorrelation in the disturbances, the spatial er-
ror model (SEM) has been developed. For a dataset with n geographical
6Collinearity had not been detected in the data according to the BKW (1980) diag-
nostics.
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units, it is written as
y = Xβ + ²
² = λW²+ u
u ∼ N(0, σ2In)
(14)
where y is the (n × 1) vector of dependent variable, X is the (n × (k + 1))
matrix of explanatory variables including a constant term, W is the (n×n)
matrix of spatial weights used to define the structure of the correlations be-
tween the disturbances and λ, the parameter of interest denotes the strength
of this spatial dependence.
The weighting scheme used to design W is usually based on contiguity be-
tween counties. In each row of W, A positive value is assigned to counties
that are close ’enough’ to county i to be considered as its neighbors and a
null value otherwise, with i = 1, . . . , n. The diagonal of this matrix contains
zero element as a county cannot be used to predict itself.
The SEM log-likelihood function is given in (15).
lnL = −(n/2)ln(2pi)− (n/2)lnσ2 + ln | I − λW |
−(1/2σ2)(y −Xβ)′(I − λW )′(I − λW )(y −Xβ).
(15)
The first order conditions give the generalized least squares estimate for β
and σ2, conditional on λ:
β̂ML = [(X − λWX)′(X − λWX)]−1(X − λWX)′(y − λWy). (16)
σ̂2ML = (e− λWe)′(e− λWe)/n, (17)
with e = y −XβML. Introducing (16) and (17) in (15) leads to the concen-
trated log-likelihood function for the SEM model.
lnLC = C − (n/2)ln[(e′(I − λW )′(I − λW )e)/n] + ln | I − λW | . (18)
Pre-multiplying (14) by (I − λW ) leads to (19).
y = λWy +Xβ − λWXβ + u. (19)
This model may be written as what is known as the spatial Durbin model
(see Anselin L. and Bera A.K.(1998)) given in (20) if the restriction −λβ = γ
is imposed in (19).
y = λWy +Xβ +WX˜γ + u (20)
where X˜ denotes the matrix of independent variables without the constant
term (i.e. each row of X is defined as xi = [1, x˜i]). In the spatial Durbin
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model (SDM), the dependent variable is explained firstly by a set of inde-
pendent variables, secondly by the average of the dependent variable (Wy)
in neighboring counties and thirdly by the average of the independent vari-
ables in neighboring counties (WX). The concentrated log-likelihood func-
tion for the SDM model is formulated in (21) with e0 = y−Xβ−WX˜γ and
e1 =Wy −Xβ −WX˜γ.
ln(L) = C − ln | I − λW | −(N/2)ln(e′0e0 − 2λe′1e0 + λ2e′1e1). (21)
The Burridge common factor allows us to test this restriction. If this con-
straint cannot be rejected, a model with spatial dependence in the distur-
bances is estimated, otherwise a SDM is estimated.
However as United States counties do not have the same size, heteroscedas-
ticity in the error term may occur. Moreover as noted by LeSage (1997)
”enclave effects”7 may lead to fat tailed errors or t distributed errors. Thus
LeSage proposed to estimate global spatial models with the Bayesian method
in order to correct this failure.
4.1.2 Assuming heteroscedastic errors
LeSage J.P (1997) proposed to introduce an additional fixed but unknown
parameter noted r in the global spatial model in order to accommodate out-
liers and observations with large variances. For instance, the heteroscedastic
spatial Durbin model may be written as:
y = λWy +Xβ +WX˜γ + ²
² ∼ N(0, σ2V )
V = diag(v1, v2, . . . , vn)
(22)
A chi-squared prior distribution for the terms in V is suggested by LeSage
pi(r/vi) = IIDχ2(r) as it reduces to introducing a single parameter noted r;
a normal-gamma conjugate prior for β and γ, and σ2 when the sample size
is large which may be formulated as follows for θ = [β γ]: pi(θ) ∼ N(c, T ),
with c and T taking large values, and pi(1/σ2) ∼ Γ(d, v). Finally a uniform
prior for λ is set as pi(λ) = U [0, 1].
4.2 Global models with flexible spatial weight matrix
Note that not only the estimation and inference results presented in the
preceding section are conditional on the specification of the spatial weight
matrix, but also this specification takes place before estimating the model
7When the relationship under study is different in a particular set of counties compared
to the entire territory under study, this is known as ”enclave effects”.
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whose aim is to detect and estimate the spatial interactions designed in W.
LeSage and Pace (2000a) proposed a Matrix Exponential Spatial Structure
model in which a flexible form for the spatial weight matrix is allowed and
is an integral part of the spatial model estimation. They also developed a
version of the MESS model (2000b) robust to heteroscedastic disturbances
and outliers in which the spatial weight matrix will be a linear combination
of individual nearest neighbor matrices with declining coefficients as we move
from the first nearest neighbors to the second and so on. This flexible weight
matrix takes the form:
W =
q∑
i=1
(
ρiNi∑q
i=1 ρi
)
(23)
where Ni represents the spatial matrix associated with the ith nearest neigh-
bors in space with i = 1, . . . , q. q is the maximum number of nearest neigh-
bors to take into account, these can be first order neighbors (i.e. direct
neighbors), second order neighbors (neighbors of neighbors) or higher order
neighbors of observations. ρ is the decay parameter which is specific to each
individual matrix N.
The Bayesian MESS model given in (25) relies on the spatial weight matrix
exponential transformation of the dependent variable specified in (26)
Sy = Zθ + ²,
² ∼ N(0, σ2In) (24)
(25)
with S the (n× n) positive, definite matrix:
S = eαW (26)
with W defined in (23)and Z = [XWX˜ . . .W l−1X˜], the matrix of explana-
tory variables with independent variables noted X˜ (excluding a constant
term) and lagged independent variables up to order (l-1). LeSage and Pace
(2000) recommended to set l = 7 to ensure the convergence in the Taylor
series expansion. Note that the ’traditional ’spatial dependence parameter,
noted before λ can be recovered as λ = 1− eα.
Robust estimates to non constant variance in the error terms can be ob-
tained through a Bayesian heteroscedastic model with the same prior for
θ, σ2, vi as in the Bayesian heteroscedastic spatial Durbin model. Non in-
formative priors on α, ρ and q i.e. the parameters entering the spatial
weight matrix are assigned using uniform distributions. More particularly,
pi(α) = U [−∞, 0], pi(ρ) = U(0, 1) and pi(q) = UD[1, qmax].
4.3 Local model: SALE
When we deal with spatial dataset, the hypothesis of spatial stationarity
defined as the stability over space of the relationship under study (Anselin,
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1988) is often not met. In this case, local models like the nonparametric
locally weighted regression (LWR) model developed by McMillen (1996) are
more appropriate than global ones as they allow for parameter heterogeneity.
However the widely used LWR method gives results that are conditional on a
single value of the bandwidth appearing in the weighting function. Chang-
ing this value produces different estimated values for the parameters and
consequently different conclusions regarding the stationarity of the relation-
ship under study. Moreover the LWR model has been constructed in such
a way that the smaller is the sub-sample size, the less frequently the spa-
tial dependence is likely to occur. Thus the LWR parameter estimates can
be used to test the variability over space of the relationship under study.
However, a locally weighted regression on a smaller sub-sample size leads to
more volatile parameter estimates which may question the significance of the
detected regional patterns in the parameter estimates. Furthermore, as the
absence of spatial dependence in the LWR residuals cannot be guaranteed
in small sub-sample size, estimating a local model with a spatially lagged
dependent variable as additional explanatory variable and then testing the
significance of the spatial dependence parameter seems appropriate. Thus to
deal simultaneously with spatial dependence and parameter heterogeneity,
Pace and LeSage (2002) propose a Spatial Autoregressive Local Estimation
(SALE). It takes the following form:
M(i)y =M(i)Wyλi +M(i)Xβi +M(i)WX˜γi +M(i)². (27)
The vectors y and ², the matrices X˜ and W are the same as those previously
defined with (14). M is a (n × n) diagonal matrix in which a value of one
is assigned to the m-nearest neighbors to observation i and a zero value for
the others. M allows to extract a sub-sample on which the regressions are
conducted. M(i)Wy is the spatially lagged dependent variable and its as-
sociated parameter, noted λi, measures the extent to which the dependent
variable in i, noted M(i)y may be explained by the average of the ones of
its nearest neighbors in space, M(i)Wy. Similarly, γi denotes the effect of
the average of the independent variables in the neighborhood of i on yi. As
pointed out by Pace and LeSage (2002), the inclusion of the spatially lagged
dependent variable in the model may firstly solve the spatial dependence
problem arising from large sub-sample size and secondly may decrease the
sensitivity of the parameter estimates to the bandwidth resulting in more
stable estimates.
Contrary to the LWR model, the SALE model may be estimated for any
sub-sample size, simply by modifying the matrix M. This provides a way
to investigate the occurrence of spatial dependence as the number of neigh-
bors is no longer constrained. In other words, this method enable us to
see how the spatial dependence parameter changes with the sub-sample size
from small to full sample i.e. from SALE (respectively LSDM) estimates
(reflecting parameter heterogeneity) to SAR (respectively SDM). estimates
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(reflecting parameter homogeneity).
Even if both methods seem similar, they are methodologically different. In
the LWR framework, the weighting scheme places a uniformity condition on
the parameter of spatially neighboring observations. This is not the case in
the the SALE method. Analyzing the beta convergence parameter estimates
for each observation of the sample, LeSage and LeGallo (2003) investigate
the empirical supporting existence of the local convergence concept in Eu-
rope.
The SALE estimates are the ones which maximize the following profile like-
lihood function (see Anselin, 1988, Pace and Barry, 1997):
lnL(λ) = C + ln | I − λW | −(n/2)ln(SSE(λ)), (28)
where C denotes a constant and SSE(λ), the sum of squared errors.
5 The results
5.1 Global aspatial and spatial models
A linear regression model is estimated with ordinary least squares. Table
1 gives the estimation and inferences results of the standard linear regres-
sion model. All the coefficients are significant on at least 5 %. The OLS
adjusted measure of fit is 0.3107. Values in brackets are the t-probability
coming from White (1980) variance matrix robust to heteroscedasticity. The
positive and significant coefficient of fractionalization is consistent with the
theoretical model. Parameter associated with income inequality has a weak
negative effect, as well as the share of people in a county speaking other
language. The log of urban population has the strongest influence on the
relative size of voluntary sector. As expected, age has a negative but small
significant effect, while the size of county assessed through the log of pop-
ulation demonstrates a small positive effect. Finally, income per capita has
the smallest positive global effect.
The OLS errors are non normally distributed according to the Jarque-Bera
test. They are also heteroscedastic as the null hypothesis of the Koenker
(1981) test robust to normal errors can be rejected at the significant level
of 5%. Moreover, two tests against unspecified alternative for the spatial
dependence process have been carried out. The spatial dependence in the
disturbances is tested using a contiguity matrix found by Delaunay triangu-
lation. The Moran I-statistic, adapted to the OLS residuals by Cliff and Ord
(1981) indicates spatial dependence in the OLS residuals. But, according to
Fingleton (1999), this test statistic may detect not only spatial dependence
but also spatial non stationarity. It is also not reliable when heteroscedas-
ticity occurs. Thus in order to evaluate the significance of both effects, tests
against specified alternatives have been realized. They have been noted
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LMLAG and LMERR. The decision rule elaborated by Anselin and Florax
(1995) enables us to choose a spatial error specification as the RLMERR
statistic is significant whereas the RLMLAG is not 8. Bidirectional tests
have also been done. Clearly, spatial dependence and heteroscedasticity are
the joint source of misspecification in the model. Thus a model with spatial
dependence in the error terms has been estimated by maximum likelihood.
The estimated results of the SEM model are given in the second column
of Table 1. The SEM model produces a positive and significant spatial au-
tocorrelation parameter. The introduction of the latter rises the adjusted
measure of fit by 50 percent. According to he LMLAG* test introducing
a spatially lagged dependent variable as additional explanatory variable to
the SEM model is not necessary. However, the Burridge common factor
test indicates that the spatial error model cannot be rewritten as a spa-
tial Durbin model (SDM) and thus the latter has to be estimated. The
results of the maximum likelihood estimation of the spatial Durbin model
are in the second column of Table 2. The coefficients of variables ”fraction-
alization” and ”age” become insignificant, while the coefficient of variable
”other language” becomes positive. The size and type of population keep
their strength, significance, and positive signs. The coefficient of the vari-
able ”poverty” remains significant and negative. The coefficient related to
education is still positive and significant, consistent with stylized facts.
The greatest coefficient is associated with the measure of urbanization. This
result is consistent with the idea according to which the social interactions
among people contribute to increase the relative size of the voluntary sector.
This could also mean that urban population is more likely to donate because
of different factors (e.g. people are better informed, the greater number of
voluntary organizations asking for donations). In fact, it is generally recog-
nized that in urban areas the public expenditures are often more important
than in smaller and rural jurisdictions. However, our result suggests that in
urban areas the increase in public expenditures g is less than the increase
in d.
It is interesting to note that the coefficient of the spatially lagged variable
”fractionalization” is significant and positive. In other words, when the
degree of population’s ethnic diversity increases in county’s direct neighbor-
hood, the relative size of the nonprofit sector in all counties increases to an
extent proportional to the geographical proximity. In contrast, the impact
of the language heterogeneity and income inequality of neighboring counties
are negative and significant.
As heteroscedasticity may occur (e.g. as counties are highly heterogeneous
8The decision rule states that if the p-value of the LMLAG statistic (respectively
LMERROR) is less than the one for the LMERROR statistic (respectively LMLAG) and
that RLMLAG (respectively RLMERROR) is statistically significant but not LMERROR
(respectively RLMLAG), then the appropriate model is the spatial autoregressive model
(SAR) (respectively the spatial error model (SEM).
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in size), we present in Table 2 the results of the Bayesian estimation of a
SDM model with an heteroscedastic prior (denoted r=4) for the variance
of the error terms. The Bayesian estimation of heteroscedastic model leads
to small changes compared to the homoscedastic model: the parameter of
”other language” becomes insignificant, while the one associated with ”age”
becomes significant and negative. One striking feature is that the measures
of ethnic, language and income heterogeneity seem to influence the relative
size of the nonprofit sector only through spatial interactions with neighbor-
ing units. The Bayesian framework allows us to compare the specifications
of the SDM model. More particularly, the posterior probability of each
of the three models may be calculated and models may be discriminated
through the calculus of posterior odds ratio: the SDM model estimated by
maximum likelihood, a SDM model with a homoscedastic prior and a SDM
model with an heteroscedastic prior. As the posterior probability equals one
for the last mentioned model, only the results of the Bayesian heteroscedas-
tic spatial Durbin model are included in the Table. Moreover, the Bayesian
homoscedastic model estimation gives the same results as the maximum
likelihood estimation as a large dataset is used in this paper.
Finally a MESS model and a Bayesian heteroscedastic MESS model have
been estimated in order to evaluate the robustness of the SDM results to a
more flexible form for the spatial weight matrix. The corresponding results
are in Table 2. Let us recall that the MESS model does not presume that the
design of the spatial interactions between counties is given a priori. More-
over, inferences may be drawn about the parameters entering the spatial
weight matrix given in (23). The (homoscedastic) MESS model better fits
the data than the (homoscedastic) SDM model as the adjusted measure of
fit raises from 0.3532 to 0.4443 when a matrix exponential transformation of
the dependent variable is used. A positive and significant spatial dependence
parameter is estimated in the MESS model, λ = 1− eα = 0.5527. However,
the extent of this detected spatial spillover is larger than in the SDM model.
In fact, the decay parameter equal to 0.887 implies what LeSage called a
”half-life” of seven neighbors meaning that the 7th nearest neighbor exerts
less than 1/2 the influence of the first nearest neighbors. Furthermore, the
posterior mean for the neighbor parameter is 21.58 with a standard devia-
tion of 7.69. Thus the magnitude of spatial influence seems to be quite small.
When non constant variance in the error terms is allowed, the strength and
scope of the spatial influence are larger than when the heteroscedastic na-
ture of the errors is ignored. The spatial dependence parameter equals 0.77
and a ’half-life ’ of eleven neighbors is estimated. Figure 3 plots the poste-
rior means of the individual variance. The pattern of higher variance over
observations 2323 to 2364 and 2861 to 2897 supports the heteroscedastic
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MESS model.9 The observations mentioned in figure 3 may be considered
as outliers.
5.2 Local spatial model
The estimated parameters of the parameterized form of the spatial weight
matrix introduced in the heteroscedastic BMESS model have been used in
the SALE model to define the spatial interdependence between the observa-
tions. Moreover, using a sub-sample of 456 observations leads to the lowest
cross-validation error at each observation, as depicted in figure 4, thus re-
gression will be run under this sub-sample size.
According to figure 3(a), a strongest interdependency in nonprofit sector
size in western counties (with highest values in Arizona and New Mexico)
and some eastern counties (states Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee) is
detected. The higher interdependency in the west may be explained by the
fact that these counties present a higher than average urbanization and face
a low density that confront them with higher costs of provision of certain
local public goods ( transportation, water supply and other services). Thus,
they are more likely to cooperate at local and state levels.
The strongest variations in the spatial dependence parameter are localized
in the central counties. This finding is linked to the existence of some unob-
served variables such as common cultural features, history, or area specifici-
ties10. Figures 3(b) to 3(g) display the local parameters for the population’s
ethnic, linguistic, and income heterogeneities and for these spatially lagged
variables. The local parameters associated with fractionalization present
an increasing trend from negative in the west to positive in the east, as
illustrated in figure 3(b). In other words, population heterogeneity has no
identical effect across observations. Figure 3(c) shows the local estimates re-
lated to linguistic heterogeneity. The parameter estimates present a rather
homogenous feature across observations with highest but still weak values
in the middle-east and in the north-west. Negative values are concentrated
in the center of the country. The local parameters associated with income
inequality are indicated in figure 3(d) . Positive coefficients are mainly lo-
calized in Florida, Georgia and partly in Texas.
Concerning the local spatial interactions between counties, the positive co-
efficients of the lagged variable of fractionalization exhibit a single-centered
pattern localized in Colorado, Kansas and Nebraska as depicted in figure
3(e). The coefficients decrease with distance from this center until they take
negative values (in Wisconsin and North Dakota, for instance). The esti-
9The heteroscedastic models present weaker values of measure of fit, than the ho-
moscedastic ones, as their primary aim is not to adjust well the model to the data, but to
be robust for heteroscedasticity.
10Note that the most important spatial interdependencies correspond to the western
area, which is also the one composed of the largest counties
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mated parameters for linguistic heterogeneity in the neighborhood of each
county (displayed in figure 3(f)) are only positive in the north part of the
center of the country (namely, Minnesota, North and South Dakota, Iowa),
while they are negative elsewhere. Finally, figure 3(g) demonstrates the pos-
itive coefficients associated with income inequality in neighboring counties
are clustered partly in Texas, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, while the nega-
tive parameters are concentrated in the extreme North-East. The aspatial
global estimation methods usually employed in the empirical studies mask
these spatial variations. This fact may lead to misleading conclusions.
6 Conclusion
In this paper the effects of population heterogeneity on the relative size of
the nonprofit sector in the United States using county level data are investi-
gated. Assuming that the relation under study is stationary over space, the
spatial interdependence between U.S. counties are taken into account via a
spatial (global) Durbin model. We show that in a global spatial setting, the
relative size of the nonprofit sector in each county depends positively among
others on the county’s linguistic heterogeneity and on the relative size of
the nonprofit sector in the neighboring counties. According to our results,
the relative size of the voluntary sector is more important in urban, more
educated and richer counties. However, these results are only global in the
sense that they ignore local spillovers that may occur. In a local setting,
population heterogeneity and more particularly ethnic diversity and linguis-
tic heterogeneity may affect the relative size of the nonprofit sector, but to
a different extent and in a different manner according to the location.
Future research may consist in developing a theoretical background to model
the spillovers detected in this study. Besides, a Baysesian spatial local es-
timation robust to heteroscedastic errors should be conducted in order to
make valid inferences on the estimates.
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Appendix
Table 1: OLS, SEM
estimations OLS SEM tests OLS SEM
constant 0.0676
(0.0088)
−0.0629
(0.0152)
JB 3.372e+5
(0.000)
-
frac 0.0643
(0.0000)
0.0294
(0.0017)
BP 2.629e+3
(0.000)
2.639e+3
(0.273)
incineg −0.0177
(0.0001)
−0.0117
(0.0012)
KB 109.57
(0.000) ()
otherlang −0.0010
(0.0000)
−0.0004
(0.0078)
Moran 26.32
(0.000)
-
logpop 0.0069
(0.0000)
0.0082
(0.0000)
LMERR 679.03
(0.000)
-
logurban 0.7702
(0.0047)
0.9061
(0.0014)
RLMERR 151.37
(0.000)
-
poverty −0.0016
(0.0031)
−0.0013
(0.0000)
LMLAG 527.69
(0.000)
-
education −0.0004
(0.0436)
0.00067
(0.0012)
RLMLAG 0.0308
(0.8607)
-
age −0.0017
(0.0000)
−0.00076
(0.01155)
LM1 3308
(0.000)
-
income 0.000004
(0.0043)
0.000003
(0.0000)
LM2 3308
(0.000)
-
λ̂ - 0.581
(0.0000)
LMLAG* − 4.356e−10
(1)
R2 0.3107 0.4628 CF − −8.25026e+7
(0)
σ̂2 0.0026 0.002 - - -
Notes: R2 is the adjusted measure of fit. JB is the Jarque-Bera normality test. BP
denotes the Breusch-Pagan heteroscedasticity test and KP a robust to non normal er-
ror heteroscedasticity test. Moran is the Moran I-statistic. LMERROR and its robust
version named RLMERROR are Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests for spatially autocor-
related errors. LMLAG and its robust version RLMLAG are tests for omitted spatially
lagged dependent variable. LM1 is a joint test for spatial dependence and heterogeneity
(Anselin, 1988, p71). It is the sum of BP and LMBI (and LMBI=RLMLAG+LMERROR
or alternatively LMBI=LMLAG+RLMERR). LM2 is the joint test for heteroscedasticity
and spatial autocorelation in the errors (Anselin, 1988, p121). It is the sum of BP and
LMERR. CF is the Burridge (1981) common factor test.
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Table 2: SDM (ML), BSDM(r=4),BMESS(r=200),BMESS(r=4)
estimations SDM BSDM BMESS(r=200) BMESS(r=4)
constant 0.0964
(0.0007)
0.0643
(0.0004)
0.125
(0.0000
0.0071
(0.3695)
frac −0.005
(0.6413)
0.0025
(0.6993)
−0.005
(0.334)
−0.00587
(0.1975)
incineg −0.00796
(0.028)
−0.00323
(0.0977)
−0.0087
(0.0125)
−0.0018
(0.1885)
otherlang 0.0006
(0.003)
0.00018
(0.165)
0.0007
(0.0000)
0.0001
(0.1555)
logpop 0.0079
(0.0000)
0.0062
(0.0000)
0.0086
(0.0000)
0.0072
(0.0000)
logurban 0.83
(0.0034)
0.522
(0.0009)
0.9142
(0.0005)
0.5888
(0.0000)
poverty −0.0012
(0.0005)
−0.00059
(0.0029)
−0.0013
(0.0005)
−0.0004
(0.0375)
education 0.00174
(0.0000)
0.0004
(0.0076)
0.0017
(0.0000)
0.0004
(0.006)
age −0.00014
(0.649)
−0.0010
(0.0000)
0.00008
(0.391)
−0.001
(0.0000)
income 0.000003
(0.0000)
0.000006
(0.0000)
0.00003
(0.0000)
0.000007
(0.0000)
Wfrac 0.04167
(0.0008)
0.0212
(0.0074)
0.0395
(0.002)
0.0073
(0.21)
Wincineg −0.0074
(0.307)
−0.0095
(0.022)
0.00174
(0.4365)
−0.005
(0.2245)
Wotherlang −0.0012
(0.0000)
−0.0008
(0.0000)
−0.00127
(0.0000)
−0.0004
(0.011)
Wlogpop −0.00488
(0.0061)
−0.0027
(0.0175)
−0.0069
(0.002)
−0.0054
(0.0015)
Wlogurban −0.962
(0.1117)
−0.5752
(0.1155)
−1.1517
(0.0975)
−0.8897
(0.0925)
Wpoverty 0.0002
(0.6766)
0.00047
(0.11036)
−0.00009
(0.439)
0.001
(0.0045)
Weducation −0.0022
(0.0000)
−0.0009
(0.0000)
−0.0023
(0.0000)
−0.0006
(0.004)
Wage −0.0013
(0.0072)
−0.0002
(0.493)
−0.0019
(0.0000)
0.0008
(0.0315)
Wincome −0.000001
(0.0000)
−0.000004
(0.0000)
−0.000001
(0.042)
−0.000005
(0.0000)
alpha - - −0.8047
(0.00000)
−1.472
(0.0000)
rho - - 0.8878
(0.00000)
0.9349
(0.0000)
q - - 21.59
(0.00000)
29.87
(0.0000)
λ 0.528
(0.0000)
0.46
(0.0000)
0.5527
(0.0000)
0.7705
(0.0000)
R2 0.3570 0.2994 0.446 0.4
σ̂2 0.0020 0.0027 0.0021 0.0005
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Figure 3: Distribution of the means for 2000 vi estimates
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Figure 4: Prediction error on center of area for various sum-sample size
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Figure 5: Local spatial Durbin model parameter estimates based on m=456
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